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THE FIRST AMENDMENT: IS THE FREEDOM OF
SPEECH MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN LIFE?
A narrow but strong First Amendment, with its strong princi-
ple universally available for all speech covered by the First
Amendment, has much to be said for it. First Amendment pro-
tection can be like an oil spill, thinning out as it broadens. But
excess precautions against this danger might lead to a First
Amendment that is so narrow as to thwart its major purposes.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech
.... "' Although the First Amendment appears unconditional on its
face, the Supreme Court has never held that the right to speak freely is
absolute.3 The refusal to conclude that the First Amendment is absolute
is manifested in an understanding that "[a]n absolute right, by definition,
is not subject to balancing" 4-- a technique courts commonly use in decid-
ing First Amendment cases.5 Under the balancing approach, "[i]f the
state interest is compelling and the means of regulation narrowly tailored
to accomplish a proper state purpose, regulation of expression is not for-
bidden by the first amendment.""
Historically, First Amendment analysis has shifted from an "ad
1. Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup.
Cr. REv. 285, 315.
2. U.S. CoNSr. amend. I.
3. Historically, "[the absolutist view of free speech has been championed and most
closely associated with Justices Black and Douglas, but it has never been explicited [sic]
adopted by a majority of the Court." JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 16.7(b), at 838 (3d ed. 1986) (footnote omitted); see also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S.
36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting):
I do not subscribe to [the doctrine that permits constitutionally protected rights to be
"balanced" away whenever a majority of this Court thinks that a State might have
interest sufficient to justify abridgment of those freedoms] for I believe that the First
Amendment's unequivocal command that there shall be no abridgment of the rights
of free speech and assembly shows that the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all
the "balancing" that was to be done in this field.
4. JOHN E. NOWAK fl" AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.7(b), at 838 (3d ed. 1986).
5. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 792-93 (2d ed.
1988).
6. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1987).
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hoe" balancing approach7 to a "categorical" balancing approach8 in de-
termining whether or not certain speech is constitutionally protected.9
While the ad hoc approach viewed individual First Amendment issues on
a case-by-case basis, the categorical approach categorizes speech, either
granting or denying First Amendment protection to the defendant based
on the character of his speech. Under the prevailing categorical balanc-
ing approach, First Amendment cases can be divided into two classes:
those involving protected speech and those involving categorically un-
protected speech."° Under the prevailing categorical balancing ap-
proach, the weight of each party's interests has been pre-determined by
an earlier decision. Although various interests have been found to out-
weigh the right to speak freely," decisions more often than not result in
favor of the party claiming First Amendment protection.'" This occurs
primarily because there is a finite list of categories which can be deemed
as undeserving of constitutional protection.
This note examines the prevailing categorical balancing approach in
detail, as used by the Pennsylvania courts in Smith v. Linn 13 ("Smith").
This note thoroughly analyzes the Pennsylvania courts' conclusion, scru-
tinizing the soundness of both the courts' choice to rely on the First
Amendment and their holding that the freedom of speech outweighs the
sanctity of human life. In doing so, this note explores the historical pro-
gression of First Amendment analysis and the rationales underlying the
7. See generally GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 983-84 (1lth ed. 1985).
For additional explanation of the "ad hoc" balancing approach, see infra text accompanying
notes 65-83.
8. See generally GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 984 (11th ed. 1985). For
an additional explanation of the "categorical" balancing approach, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 84-96.
9. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
10. Categorically unprotected speech includes: "(1) obscene speech, (2) libel, slander and
misrepresentation, (3) 'speech or writing [constituting] an integral part of conduct in violation
of a valid criminal statute,' and (4) speech which is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Peter A. Block, Note, Modem-
Day Sirens: Rock Lyrics and the First Amendment, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 777, 792-93 (1990)
(footnotes omitted) (alteration in original).
11. Id.
12. Professor Tribe notes that in cases where the Court is faced with a regulation of the
freedom of speech, "government must come forward with sufficient proof to justify convinc-
ingly its abridgment of the constitutional right to speak, in terms consistent with the basic
theory of free expression." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-8,
at 834 (2d ed. 1988) (footnote omitted). This task, Tribe argues, would "be impossible unless
government can persuasively show a harm that would be prevented by the abridgment but
could not have been prevented by dialogue; whenever 'more speech' could eliminate a feared
injury, more speech is the constitutionally-mandated remedy." Id
13. Smith v. Linn, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991).
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freedom of speech and discusses how the United States Supreme Court
has employed both the ad hoc and categorical balancing approaches of
First Amendment analysis.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts of Smith v. Linn
Patricia Smith, a resident of Norristown, Pennsylvania, shared a
similar desire with other Americans: she wanted to lose some weight.
14
While reading an issue of Family Circle magazine, Mrs. Smith noticed
some excerpts taken from The Last Chance Diet " book.' 6 The excerpts
were enticing, so Mrs. Smith decided to buy the book and get a closer
look. 7 The book's introduction contained a statement from Lyle Stuart,
the publisher, proclaiming the results of his own adherence to the "last
chance diet."'" The temptation was amplified by the book's plea to po-
tential readers:
Fat America ... here's your last chance to get thin and stay
thin. Finally, a revolutionary breakthrough in dieting that not
only helps you lose weight swiftly ... but helps you keep it
off-for good!
If you've tried pills, shots, fat farms, fad diets or fasting-
chances are you're fat today. Because until now, nobody could
tell you how to keep weight off permanently.
Don't give up. Get THE LAST CHANCE DIET. It can
change your life.' 9
In January, 1977, the mother of three purchased The Last Chance Diet,
an instructional liquid protein diet book, published by Lyle Stuart, Incor-
porated ("Stuart").20 Following the warnings found in several places in
the book,2" Mrs. Smith sought medical supervision and, for six months,
strictly followed the diet, substituting liquid protein drinks for solid
14. Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 10, Smith v. Linn, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991) (No. 831
E.D., 1989 Term; renumbered No. 68 E.D., 1990 Term).
15. DR. ROBERT LINN, THE LAST CHANCE DIET (Bantam Books 1977) (1976).
16. Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 10, Smith v. Linn, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991) (No. 831
E.D., 1989 Term; renumbered No. 68 E.D., 1990 Term) (citing the Reproduced Record at 16).
17. Id. (citing the Reproduced Record at 336-448).
18. DR. ROBERT LINN, THE LAsT CHANCE DIET ii (Bantam Books 1977) (1976).
19. Id at iii.
20. Smith v. Linn, No. 79-10524, slip op. at 5 (Ct. C.P. Montgomery County, Pa. Sept. 30,
1988).
21. See, e.g., DR. ROBERT LINN, THE LAST CHANCE DIET i, xv, back cover (Bantam
Books 1977) (1976).
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food. 22  The book had offered to "change [her] life."23  It certainly
changed Mrs. Smith's life. On July 16, 1977, after losing one hundred
and six pounds, Mrs. Smith died from cardiac failure allegedly caused by
The Last Chance Diet. 24 Specifically, "Mrs. Smith's body had consumed
its own protein (some of which is heart muscle) so that, when she ate real
food containing protein..., she was caused to have a heart attack."2 5
David H. Smith ("Smith"), Mrs. Smith's widowed husband, sued
Stuart, individually and as administrator of his deceased wife's estate.2 6
He brought claims alleging negligence,27 conscious28 and negligent mis-
representation,2 9 strict products liability,30 breach of warranty,3 1 and in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress.3 2 Filed as Smith v. Linn, the
case named several defendants,3 3 but after settlements and dismissals,
22. See Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 10, Smith v. Linn, 587 A-2d 309 (Pa. 1991) (No.
831 E.D., 1989 Term; renumbered No. 68 E.D., 1990 Term) (citing the Reproduced Record at
16).
23. DR. ROBERT LINN, THE LAST CHANCE DiET iii (Bantam Books 1977) (1976).
24. Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123, 125 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
25. Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 11 n.10, Smith v. Linn, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991) (No.
831 E.D., 1989 Term; renumbered No. 68 E.D., 1990 Term) (citing the Reproduced Record at
205-08, 235-36).
26. Smith, 563 A.2d at 124.
27. Negligence is defined as "the failure to use such care as a reasonably prudent and
careful person would use under similar circumstances...." BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 1032
(6th ed. 1990).
28. A misrepresentation is "[a]ny manifestation by words or other conduct by one person
to another that, under the circumstances, amounts to an assertion not in accordance with the
facts." IJ at 1001. This misrepresentation can be classified as "conscious" if the actor intends
his statement "to induce or should realize that it is likely to induce action by ... a third
person, which involves an unreasonable risk of physical harm to the other," and that the actor
knows of its falsity. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 (1965).
29. Negligent misrepresentation is "fain untrue statement of fact," BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 1001 (6th ed. 1990), which results in physical harm to the person to whom the
statement was made or to a third person due to the actor's "failure to exercise reasonable care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or (b) in the manner in which it is commu-
nicated." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965).
30. Strict liability is "[a] concept applied by the courts in product liability cases in which
[the] seller is liable for any and all defective or hazardous products which unduly threaten a
consumer's personal safety." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (6th ed. 1990).
31. A breach of warranty is "a violation of either an express or implied warranty relating
to title, quality, content or condition of goods sold for which an action in contract will lie." Id
at 189 (citing to U.C.C. § 2-312 et seq.).
32. Smith v. Linn, No. 79-10524, slip op. at 1-2 (Ct. C.P. Montgomery County, Pa. Sept.
30, 1988). Intentional infliction of emotional distress occurs when the actor, "in the absence of
any privilege, intentionally subjects another to the mental suffering incident to serious threats
to his physical well being, whether or not the threats are made under such circumstances as to
constitute a technical assault." State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 284-
85 (Cal. 1952).
33. In the original case, before the Court of Common Pleas, Smith named Robert Linn,
D.O., Lyle Stuart, Inc., Dixon-Shane, Inc., Howard Rosenfeld, M.D., and Robard Corpora-
FIRST AMENDMENT
Stuart was the only defendant remaining at the trial.3 4 After the dispute
was transferred from arbitration, the Court of Common Pleas "enter-
tained oral argument on the [summary judgment] motion" only and de-
cided, en banc, in favor of Stuart.35 Smith protested application of the
First Amendment, arguing that either the book fell into the unprotected
category of speech inciting "immediate unrefiecting action," 6 or that the
court should conclude that the defendant's conduct constituted negligent
publication, a tort beyond First Amendment protection.37
B. Holding
In response to Smith's appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court re-
viewed the lower court's decision in favor of Stuart.38 Although they
were "moved by the grievous circumstances surrounding the... case,'1 3,
the Pennsylvania Superior Court refused to "disturb the proper ruling of
the trial court in granting summary judgment on the basis of the first
amendment right of the publisher."' 4
In a four-part opinion, the Smith court explained its reasoning.
First, the court dismissed Smith's assertion that The Last Chance Diet fit
into an "established exception to first amendment protection,"'" thus af-
firming the trial court's decision granting Stuart's motion for summary
judgment.42 Second, the superior court declined to rely on the cases of-
fered by Smith to support a finding that sections 310, 311, and 557A of
the Second Restatement of Torts43 were intended to apply to publish-
ers.' Third, Smith offered sections 388 and 390 of the Second Restate-
tion of Cherry Hill, N.J. as "defendants." See Smith v. Linn, No. 79-10524, slip op. at 1 (Ct.
C.P. Montgomery County, Pa. Sept. 30, 1988). The case also named Hance Brothers and
White Company, Wilson Foods Corporation, Delare Associates, Inc., General Foods Corpora-
tion, and U.S. Gelatin, Division of Peter Cooper Corporation as "additional defendants." Id.
34. Smith. 563 A.2d at 124.
35. I4
36. Id at 125.
37. Id
38. Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
39. Id at 127.
40. Id
41. Id at 126.
42. The moving party is entitled to a summary judgment (a judgment as a matter of law)
"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. . . ." PA. R.
C. P. No. 1035(b), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (1987).
43. Section 310 covers Conscious Misrepresentation Involving Risk of Physical Harm; sec-
tion 311 covers Negligent Misrepresentation Involving Risk of Physical Harm; and section
557A covers Fraudulent Misrepresentations Causing Physical Harm. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS §§ 310, 311 & 557A (1965).
44. Smith. 563 A.2d at 126.
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ment of Torts45 and the holding in Incollingo v. Ewing" ("Incollingo"),
a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, for support. The Smith court's
response was a finding that "[i]nstructions by a manufacturer which ac-
company medication or use of certain marketed goods cannot be equated
with publication of books which espouse a writer's theory, opinions or
ideology."4 7 Finally, the court rejected Smith's plea to apply section
402A of the Second Restatement of Torts,4 8 which marks a seller liable
for physical harm caused by a defective or unreasonably dangerous prod-
uct, even if "he has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of the product."4 9 Instead, the court held that a book is not a product
for the purposes of strict products liability. 0 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court affirmed the superior court's decision, per curiam, on appeal in
March, 1991 without further discussion.5" This note focuses on the supe-
rior court's opinion as affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. Background: The First Amendment
The First Amendment, ratified in 1791, has given rise to much con-
troversy over its purpose, meaning, and scope. Throughout the years,
various ideas have been suggested as rationales underlying the First
Amendment. Some of the asserted rationales for the First Amendment
include promotion of "self-expression and self-realization,"5 2 "freedom
of expression for a system of representative democracy and self-govern-
45. Section 388 is entitled "Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use;" and sec-
tion 390 is entitled "Chattel for Use by Person Known to be Incompetent." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 388, 390 (1965).
46. Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206 (Pa. 1971). Incollingo used section 402A of the
Second Restatement of Torts in its determination of whether a drug manufacturer could be
held strictly liable in tort for harm caused by its products. Id at 219. Although the court
stated in a footnote that "the strict liability rule of § 402A [was] not applicable" (id. at 220
n.8), its actual analysis implied that the primary issue in the strict liability analysis was
"whether the warning that was given to the prescribing doctors was proper and adequate" (id
at 220), not whether the warnings on the cartons, labels and literature for the antibiotic drug
involved could be classified as a product for strict liability purposes. Id at 219-20.
47. Smith, 563 A.2d at 126.
48. Section 402A covers "Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User
or Consumer." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
49. Id § 402A, cmt. a.
50. Smith, 563 A.2d at 126-27.
51. Smith v. Linn, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991).
52. The concept of self-expression or self-realization rests on the idea that "free speech ...
enhance[s] the potential of individual contribution to the social welfare, thus enlarging the
prospects for individual self-fulfillment." JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 16.6, at 836 (3d ed. 1986) (footnote omitted).
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ment,"'53 and promotion of the "search for knowledge and 'truth' in the
'marketplace of ideas.' ""
Aside from the the purposes of the First Amendment, the holders of
First Amendment rights also receive important consideration. Two dis-
tinct sets of rights arise from the freedom of speech. The first set of
rights belongs to the speakers or producers of the speech. 55 This protec-
tion affords broadcasters "a strong presumption in their favor, a pre-
sumption that extends to both entertainment and news." '56 The second
set of "rights belongs to the viewers and general public, whose rights are
paramount and supersede those of the broadcasters."5
Numerous disputes have arisen regarding the meaning of the First
Amendment.5 Courts have debated whether or not the framers of the
Constitution intended the First Amendment to grant an absolute right.59
Further, the definition of the term "speech" has been the subject of ongo-
ing discussion.' Thus far, courts have found First Amendment protec-
53. The belief that self-government is an important function of free speech is based on the
suggestion that "the health of a society of self-government is nurtured by the contributions of
individuals to its functioning." Id (footnote omitted).
54. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 976 (1 1th ed. 1985) (footnote omitted);
see also JOHN E. NOWAK ET At, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.6, at 836 (3d ed. 1986); 1
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 108 (1774):
The last right we shall mention, regards the freedom of the press. The importance of
this consists, besides the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general,
in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready
communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of
union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more
honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.
quoted in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). The marketplace of ideas "theory is
built upon the premise that the first amendment prohibits government suppression of ideas
because the truth of any idea can only be determined in the 'marketplace' of competing ideas."
JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTrruTIONAL LAW § 16.6, at 836 (3d ed. 1986).
55. DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 446 A.2d 1036, 1039 (R.I. 1982).
56. Id
57. Id
58. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.5, at 833 (3d ed. 1986). The
authors note that the "[i]nterpretation of the first amendment language has not proved as
simple as Madison expected, however. A question of the intent of the Framers has been con-
tinually raised when considering the meaning of the first amendment .... " Id
59. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 792 (2d ed.
1988).
60. See Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982
Sup. CT. REv. 285, 302. Even when the expressive conduct is verbal speech, it can be found to
be unqualified for First Amendment protection because it is not the type of speech that was
intended for protection. This theory "justifies treating perjury, price fixing, solicitation to
nonpolitical crime, and contract law.., as outside the First Amendment ...." Id On the
other hand, even though the First Amendment "literally forbids the abridgment only of
'speech,'... [the Supreme Court has] long recognized that its protection does not end at the
spoken or written word." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
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tion to "extend[ ] to all artistic and literary expression, including
concerts, plays, pictures, books, movies, music, and nude dancing."6
Additionally, the scope of the First Amendment's protection has
been adjusted and readjusted in the two hundred years since its ratifica-
tion. 2 Changes in the scope of First Amendment protection are illus-
trated through two different balancing approaches: the ad hoc balancing
approach and the categorical balancing approach.63 Although both
views rely on the balancing of competing interests, they are strikingly
different in methodology."
1. The Ad Hoc Balancing Approach
The ad hoc balancing approach is a method of determining First
Amendment protection by which the outcome of a decision depends
upon "the particular facts of a particular case." '65 Because of its underly-
ing subjectivity, the approach "has been criticized for being too deferen-
tial to governmental judgments and as providing inadequate guidance to
decisionmakers."66 Partially due to its unpredictability, the ad hoc bal-
ancing approach is no longer favored by the Supreme Court.6 1 This ap-
proach, however, was an important step in the development of the
prevailing categorical balancing approach. Thus, an illustration of the
application of the ad hoc balancing approach is helpful to achieve a thor-
ough understanding of First Amendment analysis. The Supreme Court's
decision in Schenck v. United States"8 exemplifies the application of the
ad hoc balancing approach.
61. Peter A. Block, Note, Modern-Day Sirenr Rock Lyrics and the First Amendment 63
S. CAL. L. REv. 777, 790 (1990) (citing Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65
(1981)). Note, however, that even though an activity is protected by the First Amendment,
that activity may still be regulated, depending on the surrounding circumstances. Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc., Ill S. Ct. 2456, 2460 (1991). In Barnes, the Supreme Court held that
though nude dancing "had a communicative element, it was not the dancing that was prohib-
ited, but simply its being done in the nude." Id. at 2463.
62. In the mid-1950s, a change in the scope of the First Amendment occurred: "The
doctrine as defined by Holmes proved no longer to be a viable method for restricting govern-
mental invasion of free expression.... (Tihe [categorical] 'balancing test' replaced the (ad
hoc] 'clear and present danger' doctrine." JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 16.14, at 861-62 (3d ed. 1986).
63. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 984 (11th ed. 1985).
64. See id
65. Id.
66. Id. at 983-84.
67. Professor Tribe reasons that "[c]ategorical rules... tend to protect the system of free
expression better [than ad hoc balancing] because they are more likely to work in spite of the
defects in the human machinery on which we must rely to preserve fundamental liberties."
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 794 (2d ed. 1988).
68. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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In 1919, the Supreme Court decided Schenck v. United States69
("Schenck"), holding that the First Amendment does not protect "im-
passioned language"7 ° which advocated and encouraged espionage. 7'
The defendant was charged with conspiring to violate the Espionage Act,
causing or attempting to cause insubordination in the United States mili-
tary, and obstructing the draft. 2 Specifically, the flyers that Schenck cir-
culated to drafted men contained, on one side, a copy of the Thirteenth
Amendment and statements against the draft, describing it as "despotism
in its worst form and a monstrous wrong against humanity... ."'I On
the other side, the document encouraged men to assert their rights by
refusing to comply with the draft and characterized those people oppos-
ing his views as "cunning politicians and a mercenary capitalist press
"74
Writing for the Schenck majority, Justice Holmes emphasized that
even "[tlhe most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a
man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing panic.""5 The Court
recognized that "in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in
saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their con-
stitutional rights.",76 This statement suggests that the Court balanced the
competing interests on a case-by-case basis, instead of applying a rigid
formula. In doing so, the Court adopted the belief that "the character of
every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done."
'77
Schenck was decided during World War I, when it was more impor-
tant to encourage patriotism than to protect speech that encouraged espi-
onage.78 In light of this concern, Justice Holmes introduced the "clear
and present danger" test,79 a formula for determining the outcome of an
69. Id
70. Id. at 5 1.
71. Id at 52-53.
72. Id at 49.
73. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1919).
74. Id. at 51.
75. Id at 52.
76. Id
77. Id
78. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The rationale was that "[w]hen a
nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its
effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could
regard them as protected by any constitutional right." Id
79. The clear and present danger test provides that "governmental restriction on First
Amendment freedoms of speech and press will be upheld if necessary to prevent grave and
immediate danger to interests which government may lawfully protect." BLAcK's LAW Dic-
TIONARY 251 (6th ed. 1990).
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ad hoc balancing analysis."0 Holmes wrote: "The question in every case
is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such
a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."'" The Court
further emphasized that satisfaction of the test depended on the "proxim-
ity and degree" of the speech and the evil.8 2 Applying the clear and
present danger test, the Supreme Court found that Schenck's conduct, or
more specifically, his speech, qualified as a substantive evil deserving of
Congressional regulation. 3
2. The Categorical/Definitional Balancing Approach
By the 1940s, the Supreme Court began to change its application of
the clear and present danger test.8 4 The new approach was a categorical
one, whereby "the Court tended to recast [the] clear and present danger
analysis from an exercise in assessing likely consequences along a contin-
uum, to an exercise in characterizing an act as either 'in' or 'out' of a
defined category of unprotected incitements."8 " The Supreme Court con-
tinues to take a categorical balancing approach in First Amendment
cases, relying on categories of unprotected speech that have been pre-
determined by the balancing of earlier Courts.86 The Supreme Court's
decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire"7 ("Chaplinsky") demonstrates
the application of the categorical balancing approach.
In 1942, the Court decided Chaplinsky, denying First Amendment
protection to a Jehovah's Witness' comments that the Rochester City
Marshall was a "God damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist."8 8
The Supreme Court rejected Chaplinsky's argument that his speech was
protected by the First Amendment. In doing so, the Court altered its
previous ad hoc balancing test and established a new categorical ap-




84. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1017 (11th ed. 1985). In the 1940s,
"the clarity and suitability of clear and present danger were being questioned." Id.; see also
supra note 62 and accompanying text.
85. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-9, at 847 (2d ed.
1988).
86. A recent categorically-based decision is United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404
(1990). In Eichman, the Court declined to hold that flag-burning fell into one of the estab-
lished categories of unprotected speech. Id at 2407-08.
87. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
88. Id at 574.
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proach in rejecting Chaplinsky's argument that his speech was protected
by the First Amendment:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict in-
jury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has
been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.89
The Chaplinsky Court found that the benefits to the "social interest in
order and morality"9 clearly outweighed the detriment to an individual
caused by the restriction of "epithets likely to provoke the average person
to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace." 9 In other
words, under the categorical balancing approach, Chaplinsky's inciteful
speech or "fighting words" were of a nature that had been pre-deter-
mined to give rise to an evil undeserving of Constitutional protection.92
The categorical balancing approach allows courts to follow objec-
tively the guidance offered by an earlier subjective decision. Although
categorical balancing is a more clear-cut and well-defined approach than
ad hoc balancing, it does have flaws. For example, "[a]s the number of
available categories increases, so does the frequency of opportunity for
putting a case in the wrong category ... ."9 Additionally, the objective
categorical analysis can produce anomalous results due to its focus on
the words spoken and not on the harm caused.94 Further, the First
Amendment has become "increasingly intricate" since the development
of the categorical balancing approach, indicating that "maybe we are
moving toward codification of the First Amendment."'g9 This progres-
sion is "counterintuitive, for if a number of diverse values are served by
89. Id at 571-72 (citations omitted).
90. Id
91. Id at 574.
92. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
93. Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup.
Cr. REv. 285, 313.
94. Gerald R. Smith, Note, Media Liability for Physical Injury Resulting from the Negli-
gent Use of Words 72 MINN. L. REv. 1193, 1217-19 (1988).
95. Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup.
Cr. REv. 285, 309.
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the First Amendment, it would seem more likely that an equally diverse
doctrinal structure would result.",
96
B. The Categorical Balancing Approach Applied to Smith v. Linn
The Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania
used the categorical balancing approach in its decision in the trial of
Smith v. Linn. 91 In applying this approach, the court looked to the cate-
gories of unprotected speech that have been established by binding prece-
dents.98 Finding that Stuart's "speech" did not fall into a pre-existing
category of unprotected speech, the court concluded that it had to rule in
favor of Stuart on its motion for summary judgment.99 Such a decision
accepts the premise that although all the facts asserted by the plaintiff are
true, the plaintiff's legal claims still have no merit." ° Therefore, in
granting the summary judgment motion, the court indicated its belief
that Stuart could not be held responsible for the harm done, although the
book containing false information was the cause of Mrs. Smith's death.
In support of this result, the court reasoned that "[p]lacing publishers in
fear of civil liability of an untold magnitude for publishing controversial,
dangerous or even potentially harmful ideas would stifle the publication,
broadcast and exchange of all but the most simplistic material."'' 1 More
bluntly stated, the freedom to publish false information is more impor-
tant than the protection of a human life.
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Smith offered several
cases in support of his position. 102 As to the issue of First Amendment
protection,"0 3 Smith based his argument primarily on four United States
96. Id. at 313.
97. Smith v. Linn, No. 79-10524, slip op. at 18-19 (Ct. C.P. Montgomery County, Pa.
Sept. 30, 1988). The trial court concluded that "The Last Chance Diet does not fall into any of
the categories such as defamation, incitement, obscenity, fighting words or commercial speech
which would lower the shield of first amendment protection." Id
98. Id
99. Id
100. A motion for summary judgment can only be granted if there are no disputes as to the
facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. See. e.g., Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) ("The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.").
101. Smith v. Linn, No. 79-10524, slip op. at 21 (Ct. C.P. Montgomery County, Pa. Sept.
30, 1988).
102. See Smith, 563 A.2d at 125-27.
103. Smith also offered extensive support for his assertion that Stuart was liable in tort for
negligence, conscious and negligent misrepresentation, strict products liability, breach of war-
ranty, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. These issues are discussed supra
notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court cases: Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc, 10 Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc, 1 OS New York Times Co. v. Sullivanl10
and dicta"°7 found in Schenck v. United States.I' 8
1. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Ina 109
First, Smith argued that the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Ina 110 ("Gertz") "sets a precedent for [the
Pennsylvania Superior Court] to balance the life and health of an individ-
ual against the greed of a publisher in knowingly publishing [what Smith
purported to be] 'a false and dangerous food diet book.' ",I
The Gertz decision involved a "[l]ibel action ... brought against
[the] publisher of [a] magazine article describing [the] plaintiff as a 'Com-
munist-fronter,' [a] 'Leninist' and [a] participant in various 'Marxist' and
'Red' activities."' 1 2 The trial and lower appellate courts concluded that
the publisher "could assert the constitutional [First Amendment] privi-
lege because the article concerned a matter of public interest."1 13 The
Supreme Court disagreed. 1 4 Justice Powell, writing for the majority of
the Court, noted that the Supreme Court had "struggled for nearly a
decade to define the proper accommodation between the law of defama-
tion and the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amend-
ment." ' 5 The Court recognized that, were "[t]he need to avoid self-
censorship by the news media... the only societal value at issue...
publishers and broadcasters [would] enjoy an unconditional and indefea-
sible immunity from liability for defamation."' 1 6 Taking into account
104. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
105. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
106. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
107. Dicta are "[e]xpressions in [the] court's opinion which go beyond the facts before [the]
court and therefore are individual views of [the] author of [the] opinion and [are] not binding
in subsequent cases as legal precedent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 454 (6th ed. 1990).
108. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
109. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
110. Id9
!11. Smith, 563 A.2d at 125 (citing Brief for Appellant at 32, Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (No. 03101)).
112. Gertz 418 U.S. at 323. Libel is defined as "[a] maliciously written or printed publica-
tion which tends to blacken a person's reputation or to expose him to public hatred, contempt,
or ridicule, or to injure him in his business or profession." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 915
(6th ed. 1990) (citing Corabi v. Curtis Pub. Co., 273 A.2d 899, 904 (Pa. 1971)).
113. Gertz 418 U.S. at 330.
114. Id. at 332.
115. Id. at 325. Defamation is "[ain intentional false communication, either published or
publicly spoken, that injures another's reputation or good name." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
417 (6th ed. 1990).
116. Gertz 418 U.S. at 341.
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the interest of private individuals, the Court found that a publisher's im-
munity is not unconditional where, as in Gertz, the victim of the defama-
tion is a private figure rather than a public figure."' The Court's
rationale for this conclusion is apparent in its explanation of the distinc-
tion between private and public individuals with respect to defamation
law:
The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help--using
available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error
and thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation. Pub-
lic officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater
access to the channels of effective communication and hence
have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements
then [sic] private individuals normally enjoy. Private individu-
als are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state inter-
est in protecting them is correspondingly greater.' 18
The Gertz Court held that the speech in the defendant's magazine
was not protected by the First Amendment because it fell into the defa-
mation category of unprotected speech." 9 Following a similar categori-
cal balancing approach, the Smith court found that it could "derive no
such precedent from [Gertz]" 2 because Mrs. Smith was not the victim
of defamation. In granting Stuart's motion for summary judgment, the
Smith court resolved any doubts as to issues of fact in favor of Smith. 2'
Hence, the Smith court must have agreed with Smith's assertion that The
Last Chance Diet was "false and dangerous." If the book did contain
false information, Stuart's speech is unprotected based on the Gertz
holding that "there is no constitutional value in false statements of
fact."' 22 Apparently, the Smith court was unaware of this flaw in its
reasoning because it otherwise failed to distinguish Gertz convincingly.
2. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 1
23
In addition to the Gertz decision, Smith also relied on the Supreme
117. See id. at 348.
118. IML at 344.
119. Id. at 343-44:
Because an ad hoc resolution of the competing interests at stake in each particular
case is not feasible, we must lay down broad rules of general application. Such rules
necessarily treat alike various cases involving differences as well as similarities. Thus
it is often true that not all of the considerations which justify adoption of a given rule
will obtain in each particular case decided under its authority.
120. Smith, 563 A.2d at 125.
121. See supra notes 42, 100.
122. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.
123. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
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Court's decision in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 124
("Dun & Bradstreet") to support his position.125 The Dun & Bradstreet
case involved a "credit reporting agency [that] sent a report to five sub-
scribers indicating that [the] respondent construction contractor [Green-
moss] had filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy. The report was false
and grossly misrepresented [the] respondent's assets and liabilities."' 126
In actuality, a "high school student [who was] paid to review Vermont
bankruptcy pleadings, had inadvertently attributed to [Greenmoss] a
bankruptcy petition filed by one of [Greenmoss'] former employees."' 27
The Dun & Bradstreet plurality12 noted that the Court had "long
recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment impor-
tance.'"129 The Court distinguished the strong First Amendment protec-
tion that is applied to "matters of public concern"1 10 from the less
powerful protection given to "matters of purely private concern.' 31 In
Dun & Bradstreet, the Court justified the differing degrees of protection
on the basis of whether the matter is of private or public concern, 132 by
explaining that "speech on public issues occupies the 'highest rung of the
hierarchy of First Amendment values,' and is entitled to special protec-
tion."' 133 This special protection is rooted in the understanding that pub-
lic figures have "voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of
injury from defamatory statements and because they generally [have] ef-
fective opportunities for rebutting such statements."' 34 Protecting pri-
vate matters, on the other hand, is less important because they pose "no
threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential
interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning self-govern-
124. Id
125. Smith, 563 A.2d at 125.
126. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 749.
127. Id at 752.
128. A plurality opinion is "[ain opinion of an appellate court in which more justices join
than in any concurring opinion (though not a majority of the court) ...." BLACK's LAW
DICrIONARY 1154 (6th ed. 1990). Additionally, "[a] plurality opinion carries less weight
under stare decisis than does a majority opinion." BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 327 (2d ed.
1984). Justice Powell wrote the Dun & Bradstreet plurality, in which he was joined by Justices
Rehnquist and O'Connor. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 751. Chief Justice Burger, id at 763,
and Justice White, id at 765, concurred individually in the judgment, while Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined in dissent. Id at 774.
129. Id at 758.
130. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985) (quoting
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)).
131. Id at 759.
132. See Id. at 761-64.
133. Id at 759 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)).
134. Id at 756 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345).
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ment .... ,,13' The Court noted that "the market provides a powerful
incentive to a credit reporting agency to be accurate, since false credit
reporting is of no use to creditors."' 3 6 Thus, the Court held "that per-
mitting recovery of presumed and punitive damages in defamation cases
absent a showing of 'actual malice' does not violate the First Amendment
when the defamatory statements do not involve matters of public con-
cern. '137 Greenmoss recovered both presumed and punitive damages.
138
As in Gertz, the plaintiff in Dun & Bradstreet sued to recover dam-
ages for harm of a defamatory character. 139 Because Smith did not allege
defamation, the Smith court concluded that Dun & Bradstreet, "which
held that false statements in a credit report did not involve matters of
public concern which would require a showing of actual malice to re-
cover presumed and punitive damages," was inapposite to Smith's argu-
ment." Smith's reference to a case involving defamation, an established
category of unprotected speech, had no bearing on the Smith court's de-
cision. Because no defamation claim was made on behalf of Mrs. Smith,
the Smith court correctly declined to follow the Dun & Bradstreet
decision.
3. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan'
Third, Smith urged the Pennsylvania Superior Court to accept his
claim as analogous to that brought in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 42
("Sullivan"). 14 3 In that case, L.B. Sullivan, an elected commissioner of
Montgomery, Alabama, who was in charge of the police department,
brought a civil libel suit against the New York Times Company."
Although Sullivan was not expressly 4 ' libeled,'" he claimed that all ref-
135. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985) (quoting
Harley-Davidson Motorsports v. Markley, 568 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Or. 1977)).
136. Id at 762-63.
137. Id at 763.
138. Id
139. Id at 752.
140. Smith. 563 A.2d at 125-26.
141. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
142. Id
143. Smith. 563 A.2d at 126.
144. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256. Sullivan sued four black Alabama clergymen and the New
York Times Company, "a New York corporation which publishes the New York Times, a
daily newspaper." Id
145. Neither of the statements printed in the New York Times mentioned Sullivan by name.
Id. at 258.
146. The Supreme Court explained that, "[u]nder Alabama law as applied in this case, a
publication is 'libelous per se' if the words 'tend to injure a person... in his reputation' or to
'bring [him] into public contempt';... the standard [is] met if the words are such as to 'injure
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erences to the police found in a paid "editorial" advertisement published
in the New York Times caused him harm. 47 The article described an
encounter in which "truckloads of police armed with shotguns and tear-
gas ringed the Alabama State College Campus."' 48 Additionally, Sulli-
van claimed that references to police as "they" further on in the article
libeled him:
Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr.
King's peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They
have bombed his home almost killing his wife and child. They
have assaulted his person. They have arrested him seven
times-for "speeding," "loitering" and similar "offenses." And
now they have charged him with "perjury"-a felony under
which they could imprison him for ten years .... 149
The Supreme Court reversed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, holding
that "the rule of law applied by the Alabama courts [was] constitution-
ally deficient for failure to provide safeguards for freedom of speech and
of the press that are required" by the First Amendment. 150 The Court
found that the advertisement clearly qualified for constitutional protec-
tion' 5 ' and that the advertisement did not "lose its constitutional protec-
tion merely because it [was] effective criticism [of the official conduct of
government officials]."' 
52
The Pennsylvania Superior Court found Smith's suggested analogy
to Sullivan to be inappropriate.'53 The United States Supreme Court
held that the "speech" at issue in Sullivan was protected because it did
not satisfy the elements of libel, an unprotected category of speech. 5
4
Smith, on the other hand, made no libel claim on behalf of his deceased
wife, and therefore could not recover by analogizing to the Supreme
Court's holding in Sullivan. '5 1
him in his public office, or impute misconduct to him in his office, or want of official integrity,
or want of fidelity to a public trust..... Id. at 267.
147. Id at 256.
148. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 257 (1964) (emphasis added).
149. Id at 257-58 (emphases on "they" added).
150. Id at 264.
151. Id at 271.
152. Id. at 273.
153. Smith, 563 A.2d at 126.
154. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86. The court "further [held] that under the proper safe-
guards the evidence presented in this case is constitutionally insufficient to support the judg-
ment for [the plaintiff]." Id at 264-65.
155. Smith. 563 A.2d at 126.
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4. Schenck v. United States
1 56
Smith apparently found additional support for his claim in Schenck
v. United States 57 ("Schenck"), although he did not specifically cite it in
the pleadings. 58 Smith alleged that publishing "a false and dangerous
food diet book" could be likened to the unacceptable abuse of speech
exercised when one shouts "Fire!" in a crowded theatre.159 The "Fire!"
hypothetical originally arose in the context of Justice Holmes' broad
statement in the Schenck opinion that even "[t]he most stringent protec-
tion of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a
theatre and causing a panic.""l6 Justice Holmes emphasized that the
"question in every case is whether the words used are used in such cir-
cumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent."1 61 At issue in Schenck was whether or not advocacy
against the draft deserved First Amendment protection in light of the
fact that the United States was involved in World War I at the time.162
The Pennsylvania Superior Court found the analogy to be "inappo-
site""63 for two reasons. First, Justice Holmes advocated an ad hoc bal-
ancing approach in Schenck that recognized the nation's involvement in
the War. I" Thus, the Schenck Court denied the defendant First Amend-
ment protection based on the specific events of the time. In contrast, the
Smith court followed a categorical balancing approach. 6 ' Second, even
had the Smith court applied an ad hoc balancing approach, nothing as-
sured the plaintiff that the result would have been similar to that in
Schenck The Smith case was decided in "the Gimme decade,"' 66 a time
of "pinched privatism, . . . smug selfishness, . . . glib pragmatism, ...
156. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
157. Id
158. Smith's brief included an analogy of Stuart's conduct to that of someone shouting
"Fire!" in a crowded theater. Smith, 563 A.2d at 126. Smith "appearfed] to be referring to
the Opinion written by Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, although he offer(ed
the Pennsylvania] Court no case authority for his contention." Id. at n.2 (citations omitted).
159. Id
160. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
161. Id.
162. See id
163. Smith, 563 A.2d at 126.
164. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
165. See Smith, 563 A.2d at 126. Because Smith did "not point [the court] to any estab-
lished exception to first amendment protection, [it could not] find the court erred in finding
publication of The Last Chance Diet to be protected under the first amendment." Id (empha-
sis added).
166. Anthony DeCurtis, The Eighties, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 15, 1990 at 59, 60.
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grim status consciousness,... [and] brutal superficiality." 67 Society's
values and fears had changed dramatically in the seventy-two years be-
tween the Schenck and Smith decisions. Because of these changes, the
reasoning used in Schenck could not have been applied to the facts in
Smith, even through an ad hoc balancing approach.
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE SMITH COURT'S REASONING
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's conclusion that Stuart was not
responsible for Mrs. Smith's death is proper. The reasoning that led to
the result, however, was unnecessarily and improperly based on the First
Amendment. Instead of dismissing Smith's claims for constitutional rea-
sons, the Pennsylvania court should have based its dismissal on state tort
and contract law.
As early as 1923, cases brought against publishers have resulted in
findings in favor of those defendants. 168 The reasoning of these decisions
has included reliance on both tort and contract law, 169 as well as reliance
on the First Amendment. 70 A court's rationale can control the proce-
dural future of the case. Choice of applicable law determines whether or
not the decision may be subject to Supreme Court review.'17 Where, as
in Smith, the court's decision rested on both state and federal grounds,
167. Id
168. See, eg., Jaillet v. Cashman, 139 N.E. 714 (N.Y. 1923).
169. See, eg., Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 157 N.E. 272,
273 (N.Y. 1927) (In response to the appellant's argument "that the respondent should be held
liable for careless words," the New York Court of Appeals held that "negligent words are not
actionable unless they are uttered directly, with knowledge or notice that they will be acted on,
to one to whom the speaker is bound by some.., duty, arising out of public calling, contract
or otherwise, to act with care if he acts at all."); Jaillet 139 N.E. at 714 (The New York Court
of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, holding "that the relation of [the] defendant to
the public was the same as that of a publisher of a newspaper and that it was not liable to one
with whom it had no contract or fiduciary relationship for an unintentional mistake in its
report.").
170. See, eg., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1025 (5th Cir. 1987) (The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that they did not have to decide
whether the plaintiff "would have been entitled to recover damages under Texas tort law."
Instead, the court found that the defendant, Hustler Magazine, could not be held liable "on the
basis that the article was an incitement to attempt a potentially fatal act without impermissibly
infringing upon freedom of speech." Id.); Demuth Dev. Corp. v. Merck & Co., 432 F. Supp.
990, 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (In denying the plaintiff's claims for negligence and willful misrep-
resentation, the district court held that "Merck's right to publish free of fear of liability is
guaranteed by the First Amendment... and the overriding societal interest in the untram-
meled dissemination of knowledge." (citation omitted)); Aim v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co.,
480 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (The Illinois Appellate Court held that "[e]ven if
liability could be imposed consistently with the Constitution, we believe that the adverse effect
of such liability upon the public's free access to ideas would be too high a price to pay.").
171. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW 57 (1 lth ed. 1985).
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an ambiguous holding may require wasteful and time-consuming efforts
to clarify the reasons underlying the decision. More important, an am-
biguous holding offers little or no guidance to the lower courts in the
same jurisdiction. Without guidance, the range of every court's judicial
interpretation of both state and federal law has the potential to broaden
uncontrollably. Subjecting the First Amendment to an infinite number
of differing interpretations endangers the uniform application of the
Constitution.
Because there was no binding authority 72 in support of holding a
publisher liable for negligent publication, 1" the Smith court looked to
persuasive authority.174 This gave the Pennsylvania Superior Court the
option to rely on either federal or state law in support of its conclusion.
The outcome of the decision would have been the same either way, but
the case's future in the court system depended on the court's choice of
applicable law. This is because, "[i]n constitutional litigation,.., even
though [a] state court opinion may include an elaborate discussion of the
meaning of the federal guarantee ... the Supreme Court will not review
if the state judges rest their decision on their own constitutional [or statu-
tory] provisions as well."- ' The Smith court wisely elected to follow
state law with respect to a portion of its holding.1
6
A. The Court Should Have Dismissed Smith's Claims Based on State
Tort and Contract Law
1. Smith's Tort and Contract Claims
The trial court in Smith described Smith's complaint as "sound[ing]
in negligence, conscious and negligent misrepresentation, strict products
liability, breach of warranty, and the intentional infliction of emotional
172. Binding authorities are "[slources of law that must be taken into account by a judge in
deciding a case; for example, statutes or decision by a higher court of the same state on point."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 169 (6th ed. 1990).
173. Smith. 563 A.2d at 125. Smith argued that the court "should reverse the decision of
the trial court that the diet book publisher was within its first amendment right to freedom of
speech, and find instead, for the first time, that a publisher is liable to a reader for negligent
publication of a book which it published." Ii (emphasis added).
174. Id The court commented that the trial opinion "set forth a thorough review of deci-
sions of various jurisdictions in the United States, both state and federal, which have dealt with
the issue of imposition of civil liability on a publisher for alleged 'negligent publication.'" IM.
Persuasive authority is "that law or reasoning which a given court is likely but not bound to
follow. For example, decisions from one jurisdiction may be persuasive authority in the courts
of another jurisdiction." J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN & Roy M. MERSKY, LEGAL RESEARCH IL-
LUSTRATED xxxiv (1987 ed.).
175. Id.
176. Smith, 563 A.2d at 126-27.
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distress." 17 7 These claims were based on various sections of the Second
Restatement of Torts, 178 Pennsylvania's adopted version of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 79 and various non-binding judicial decisions.8 0 For
each tort or contract claim, a plaintiff must prove the specified elements
of that claim in order to succeed."8" Therefore, a judicial ruling should
rest solely on whether the plaintiff met his or her assumed burden of
proof for each claim brought.
2. The Court's Treatment of Smith's Claims
The Pennsylvania Superior Court divided its opinion into four parts.
Three of these parts dismissed Smith's tort and contract claims based on
insufficient proof of the elements of those claims. For example, as to
Smith's assertion that Stuart was liable for conscious, negligent, and
fraudulent"8 2 misrepresentation involving a risk of physical harm, the
court found that Smith had failed to show that Stuart owed a duty of
177. Smith, No. 79-10524, slip op. at 2 (Ct. C.P. Montgomery County, Pa. Sept. 30, 1988).
For definitions of negligence, conscious and negligent misrepresentation, strict liability, breach
of warranty, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress, see supra notes 27-32.
178. Smith, No. 79-10524, slip op. at 23 n.5 (Ct. C.P. Montgomery County, Pa. Sept. 30,
1988): "Plaintiff'relies on § 302(a), 303, 307, 308, 310, 311, 321, 388, 390, 402A and § 402B of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts." The Smith court dismissed the above claims because
"[njothing in [those] sections, the illustrations or the comments thereto, suggests they were
meant to be applied to publishers." Id at 24.
179. Id at 25. Smith's claims for breach of express and implied warranty were based on 13
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes Annotated sections 2313, 2314. Id The trial court dis-
missed the warranty claims because they were "unwilling to hold that the content of a book or
a publication is a 'good' or a 'product' for purposes of U.C.C. warranties or for § 402A (strict
liability] purposes." I at 26.
180. See Smith, No. 79-10524, slip op. passim (Ct. C.P. Montgomery County, Pa. Sept. 30,
1988). The Smith court distinguished several cases, sometimes identifying them as asserted by
the plaintiff and sometimes merely citing to them without such identification; see, e.g., id at
27: "[P]laintiff cites Kercsmar . Pen Argyl School District, 1 D.&C.3d 1 (1976) for the propo-
sition that a book's contents are a product within the scope of the Uniform Commercial Code,
13 Pa. C.S.A. § 2102 (1984)."; see also id. at 28: "Plaintiff relies upon cases upholding liability
on printers of aviation and nautical charts in support of his argument that liability be imposed
on Lyle Stuart in this matter."
181. A cause of action is a "state of facts which would entitle [a] party to sustain [an] action
and give him [the] right to seek a judicial remedy in his behalf." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
221 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Thompson v. Zurich Ins. Co., 309 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (D.C. Minn.
1970)).
182. Explaining that the lower court "did not specifically address section 557A," the supe-
rior court nevertheless included this section in its discussion. Its rationale was that the lower
court's reasoning "that nothing in the Restatement sections relied upon by [the] appellant
suggests their applicability to publishers of information" also applied to section 557A. Smith,
563 A.2d at 126 n.3. Fraudulent misrepresentation is a "false statement as to [a] material fact,
made with [the] intent that another rely thereon, which is believed by [the] other party and on
which he relies and by which he is induced to act and does act to his injury, and [the] state-
ment is fraudulent if [the] speaker knows [the] statement to be false if it is made with utter
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care to its readers.183 Additionally, the court's opinion suggested, with-
out actually stating, that Smith had failed to establish the causation ele-
ment with respect to his claim under sections 388 and 390 of the Second
Restatement of Torts. 184 These sections make a person liable for harm to
a third party caused by the supply of a chattel,"8 5 known to be danger-
ous, that was used for its intended purpose or which was supplied to a
person known to be incompetent."8 6 Further, the court rejected Smith's
claims under strict liability,"8 7 explaining that Smith had failed to prove
that a book was a "product" within the meaning of the law.' Last, the
court addressed Smith's final tort claim for "negligent publication."'1 9
However, the court undertook a First Amendment analysis, instead of
conducting a tort analysis from which it could have quickly concluded
that Stuart owed no duty of care to Smith.' 90
B. Precedent Supporting a Conclusion Based on Tort
and Contract Law
Two cases decided prior to Smith that involved similar factual pat-
terns and conclusions based on state law are Demuth Development Corp.
v. Merck & Co. 19' ("Demuth") and Aim v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co. 1
92
("Aim"). These two decisions exemplify the proper use of state law in
deciding cases brought against publishers. Additionally, both cases serve
as persuasive precedent for the Pennsylvania courts to follow, although
neither Demuth nor Aim were Pennsylvania decisions.
In 1977, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York decided Demuth, which involved facts similar to those in
Smith. The plaintiff manufactured the Demuth Glycol Vaporizer, "an
disregard of its truth or falsity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 662 (6th ed. 1990) (citing
Cormack v. American Underwriters Corp., 288 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979)).
183. Smith, 563 A.2d at 126. The court found that nothing in the offered law implied that
it was "intended to apply to publishers, nor would case law cited by [the] appellant suggest
[that the law] may be applied in such a way." l
184. The Smith court rejected the plaintiff's claim that Stuart was "as responsible as if he
had directly sold the liquid protein to the decedent and concomitantly with the sale had sup-
plied her with the book as a form of 'package insert."' Id
185. A chattel is "[ain article of personal property, as distinguished from real property."
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 236 (6th ed. 1990).
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 388, 390 (1965).
187. Id § 402A.
188. Smith, 563 A.2d at 126-27.
189. Id at 125.
190. Id at 125-26. Actually, the trial court's application of the First Amendment to these
claims was the issue addressed on appeal.
191. Demuth Dev. Corp. v. Merck & Co., 432 F. Supp. 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
192. Aim v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 480 N.E.2d 1263 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
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air sterilization appliance... used in hospitals and by manufacturing
firms requiring germ-free environments."""3 The defendant published
The Merck Index "an encyclopedia of chemicals and drugs [which] con-
tains ... information of value to chemists, biochemists, pharmacists, bot-
anists, physicists, chemical engineers, and others interested in the life
sciences." '194 The suit arose when the defendant published an incorrect
definition of triethylene glycol, "a chemical indispensable to the opera-
tion of plaintiff's glycol vaporizer," characterizing it as being toxic to
humans. 1" The plaintiff brought suit, alleging "compensatory and puni-
tive damages of $4,000,000... seek[ing] compensation for what it claims
was either a negligent... or a willful . ., misrepresentation." '96
According to the district court, the pivotal question in the case was
"whether Merck owed any duty to plaintiff in respect of its publication of
information about triethylene glycol"-an issue sounding in tort law.
197
In finding for the defendant, the court held that "[t]hough the law of
New York recognizes that 'a negligent statement may be the basis of
recovery of damage,' "198 "[n]ot every casual response, not every idle
word, however damaging the result, gives rise to a cause of action."
1 99
The court asserted:
Liability in such cases arises only where there is a duty ... to
give the correct information.... There must be knowledge, or
its equivalent, that the information is desired for a serious pur-
pose; that he to whom it is given intends to rely and act upon it;
that, if false or erroneous, he will because of it be injured in
person or property. Finally, the relationship of the parties,
arising out of contract or otherwise, must be such that in
morals and good conscience the one has the right to rely upon
the other for information, and the other giving the information
owes a duty to give it with care.2'
Complying with New York state law, the Demuth court found that
the defendant could not be held liable because the plaintiff had not relied
"to its detriment on misinformation published by Merck,"' the rela-
193. Demuth, 432 F. Supp. at 991.
194. IU (quoting THE MERCK INDEX) (alteration in original).
195. Id
196. Id. at 992.
197. Id
198. Demuth Dev. Corp. v. Merck & Co., 432 F. Supp. 990, 992 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (quoting
Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 53 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1945)).
199. International Prods. Co. v. Erie R.R. Co., 155 N.E. 662, 664 (N.Y. 1927).
200. Id.
201. Demuth, 432 F. Supp. at 993.
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tionship between the parties was insufficient to create a duty, and
"Merck's right to publish free of fear of liability is guaranteed by the
First Amendment and the overriding societal interest in the untram-
meled dissemination of knowledge."20 2 The court discarded the plain-
tiff's claim for negligent misrepresentation, stating that to hold otherwise
"would serve neither justice nor the public interest because of its mani-
festly chilling effect upon the right to disseminate knowledge."
20 3
In Aim, the Illinois Court of Appeals decided an issue very similar
to that in Smith. Mr. Alm purchased The Making of Tools, published by
the defendant Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., Inc., and was injured when a
tool he was making according to the book's instructions shattered.2 '
Alm sued both the author and the publisher of the book for damages.2""
The trial court dismissed Alm's complaint, "ruling that there is no duty
on the part of a publisher to verify the material it publishes. 21 °6 The
appellate court affirmed, stating that recognizing a cause of action for
negligent misrepresentation "would place upon publishers the duty of
scrutinizing and even testing all procedures contained in any of their
publications. "207
Although the Aim court clearly relied on state tort law, it briefly
addressed application of the First Amendment to the relevant facts. The
Illinois court discussed cases that "declined, on First Amendment
grounds, to impose a duty similar to the one urged by [Alm]."20" The
court explained that the only reason it was mentioning the First Amend-
ment was because the parties had argued it, thus implying that such men-
tion was otherwise unnecessary. 9
In its discussion of the First Amendment, the Illinois court stated
that the plaintiff had attempted to distinguish the defendant's "how to"
book from other books, such as treatises on "politics, religion, philoso-
phy, interpersonal relationships, [and] the like."2 1 With little explana-
tion, the court dismissed this distinction, justifying its dismissal by
asserting that a finding of liability would have a chilling effect on publish-
ers. 2 1' The Aim opinion concluded that "[e]ven if liability could be im-
202. It. (citation omitted).
203. IdM at 994.
204. Aim. 480 N.E.2d at 1264.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1267.
208. Id.




posed consistently with the Constitution,.. . the adverse effect of such
liability upon the public's free access to ideas would be too high a price to
pay."' 212 The court's choice of words suggests that its opinion, at least
regarding the applicability of the First Amendment, rested on public pol-
icy grounds rather than on black letter law. Because public policy is
vague and subjective at times, it would have been more precise and pre-
dictable to base the holding on black letter state tort law.
The court's decision to reserve its policy statements for the end of
the opinion reflects the general tendency to begin with the strongest and
most convincing argument and conclude with weaker but supportive
contentions. Clearly, the court relied heaviest on state tort law to sup-
port its holding in the case. In fact, the court's discussion of the First
Amendment arguably was merely dicta and not part of the binding deci-
sion because the court concluded that the plaintiff stated no cause of ac-
tion before it began any discussion of the First Amendment.
Additionally, the court explicitly stated that the only reason it discussed
the First Amendment was because the parties had argued it. Further,
the portion of the opinion that addressed the First Amendment sounded
in public policy arguments rather than black letter tort law.
The facts underlying the disputes in both Demuth and Alm are strik-
ingly analogous to those in Smith. These cases offer examples to future
courts in other states when confronting cases of first impression involving
similar First Amendment issues. The Smith court should have looked to
the New York and Illinois examples and decided in favor of Stuart based
solely on state law. By failing to follow the persuasive authority, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court failed to set a clear and effective example
for future cases in both Pennsylvania and other states.
V. THE SMITH COURT'S OTHER OPTIONS
A. A New Category of Unprotected Speech
1. The Irony of the Present Interpretation of the First Amendment
The current practice of the United States Supreme Court is to pro-
vide remedies for victims of defamatory or privacy-invading speech. 213
These victims are compensated because the speech with which they were
attacked happens to fall into a category outside of First Amendment pro-
tection. The harm caused to these victims is generally to their reputa-
212. a t
213. See, eg., Gertz 418 U.S. at 345-46 ("[W]e conclude that the States should retain sub-
stantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to
the reputation of a private individual.").
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tions, damaging intangible concepts such as the victim's future earning
potential.2 4 When the type of speech has been deemed as shielded by
the First Amendment, however, the speaker is completely protected from
all claims arising out of those types of speech. 215 This protection exists
without regard to the type or extent of harm caused by the speech.216
Ironically, the harm done to the victims of protected speech can be fatal,
and yet still go uncompensated. 21 7 This anomaly occurs solely because of
arbitrarily created categories of unprotected speech. Instead of focusing
on the degree of harm suffered by the victim, the courts look to the na-
ture of the speech. This process balances away the individual victim's
interest in favor of society's overall interest in the free flow of ideas.
Although this practice abides by the judicial interpretations of the First
Amendment, it may lead to shocking results, thus indicating that a less
harsh alternative may exist.
2. A Possible Solution
A viable alternative to the Supreme Court's current approach would
be to create an additional category of unprotected speech labelled "the
negligent use of words."2 ' This category would provide an opportunity
for victims of negligent speech to recover for their physical injuries with-
out disrupting the Supreme Court's current application of the categorical
analysis to First Amendment cases. In order to curb the number of
claims brought under this proposed exception to First Amendment pro-
tection, the Court would need to set a minimum amount of harm suffered
for a plaintiff to have standing to bring suit. Although this standard
would be arbitrary, a review of past cases can serve as a guide to where
the line should be drawn.
There have been cases where the victim of negligent speech has suf-
214. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 752 (The plaintiff "alleged that the false report
had injured its reputation and sought both compensatory and punitive damages."); Sullivan,
376 U.S. at 260 (Sullivan did not try "to prove that he suffered actual pecuniary loss as a result
of the alleged libel." In fact, a former employer.., testified that if he had believed the state-
ments,. . . he would not re-employ respondent if he believed 'that he allowed the Police De-
partment to do the things that the paper say he did.' ").
215. As one author wrote, "[C]ourts have not stated convincingly why an actor will be
excused from liability for injury resulting from words but held liable when the same injury
results from analogous actions." Gerald R. Smith, Note, Media Liability for Physical Injury
Resulting from the Negligent Use of Words, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1193, 1218-19 (1988).
216. "The categorical approach, identifying speech as either protected or unprotected and
barring civil liability for protected speech, does not consider adequately the state interest in
protecting individuals from physical harm." Id. at 1217.
217. See, e.g., DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Co., 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982).
218. See Gerald R. Smith, Note, Media Liability for Physical Injury Resulting from the
Negligent Use of Words, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1193, 1202 (1988).
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fered grave harm and yet the defendant's speech was found to be pro-
tected by the First Amendment. One example is the decision in
DeFiippo v. National Broadcasting Co.219 ("DeFilippo"). In DeFilippo,
the plaintiffs were the parents of the deceased Nicky DeFilippo, suing
individually and as administrators of their son's estate.2 0 The suit arose
when Nicky DeFilippo accidentally hung himself to death while trying to
emulate a stunt shown on The Tonight Show.221 The stunt performed
"involved dropping through a trapdoor with a noose around [the per-
former's] neck." 2  After briefly reviewing the law, the court concluded
that "[o]f the four classes of speech which may legitimately be pro-
scribed,. . . the only one under which [the] plaintiffs can maintain this
action is incitement to immediate harmful conduct under Brandenburg v.
Ohio. 3 The DeFilippo court found, however, that the incitement claim
could not succeed because "Nicky was.., the only person who is alleged
to have emulated the action portrayed in the 'hanging' on the May 23,
1979 broadcast of 'The Johnny Carson Show.' "224 Although the Rhode
Island Supreme Court found the accident to be "unusual and tragic, ' ,
it held that the First Amendment barred relief to the DeFilippos.
226
The court's reasoning suggests that, although one person's death is
insufficient to support restriction of the speech, the court might have de-
cided otherwise if a group of people had died. Had the court's decision
been different, its holding would have been based more on public policy
than on black letter tort law.
B. Treat a Book as a Product Under a Strict
Product Liability Analysis
Another solution to the problem that arises when physically injured
plaintiffs are denied recovery while defamed plaintiffs are granted enor-
mous awards is to classify a book as a product under section 402A of the
Second Restatement of Torts. This argument was offered by Smith in his
briefs throughout the lawsuit. 27 Smith argued that books are compara-
ble to charts and guides for air and sea navigation which have been clas-
219. DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Co., 446 A.2d 1036 (ELI. 1982).
220. Id at 1037.
221. I d at 1037-38.
222. Id. at 1037.
223. Id. at 1040 (citation omitted).
224. DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Co., 446 A.2d 1036, 1037 (R.I. 1982).
225. Id
226. I at 1038.
227. Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 43, Smith v. Linn, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991) (No. 831
E.D. 1989 Term; renumbered No. 68 E.D., 1990 Term).
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sifled as "products" for strict liability purposes when these charts and
guides are found to have been "erroneously prepared."" 8 A finding that
a book is, in fact, a "product" for purposes of strict liability "is a suffi-
cient basis for permitting the jury to determine the extent of Lyle Stuart's
liability in this case." '229
The Smith court, however, was unimpressed with Smith's argu-
ments supporting consideration of a book as a product. Reasoning that
"no appellate court in any jurisdiction has held a book to be a product
for purposes of section 402A,"230 the Pennsylvania Superior Court de-
nied Smith's proposal of the classification.231 The Pennsylvania court
also distinguished Kercsmar v. Pen Argyl Area School District232 ("Kerc-
smar"), which Smith offered as further support. In differentiating Kerc-
smar, the Smith court offered a weak excuse for not following the
decision in that case. In Kercsmar, the court held that a text book could
properly be considered "goods within the meaning of ... the Uniform
Commercial Code . . . ."I" In its dismissal of Smith's proposal, the
Smith court asserted that, "[w]hile Kercsmar does suggest at least that a
trial court believed the contents of a book to be a good, as an appellate
court, we may decline to accept that view." '234 Although its contentions
were correct, the Smith court failed both to confront Smith's arguments
fairly and to dismiss them with logical and clear reasoning.
Concededly, the assertion that a book should be considered a prod-
uct for strict liability purposes does not have strong legal support. When
a book is compared to air and sea navigational charts, however, the asser-
tion is more convincing. The mere fact that the manufacturer of a simi-
lar written item can be held liable under strict product liability law
supports an analogy to books. Nevertheless, the Smith court denied the
analogy, although Smith cited numerous cases in his brief. The justifica-
tion offered by the Pennsylvania court was that "[i]n those cases, ex-
tremely technical and detailed materials were involved, upon which a
limited class of persons imposed absolute trust having reason to believe
in their unqualified reliability. ' 235 This rationalization serves to discredit
228. Id at 44 (citing Reminga v. United States, 631 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980); Aetna Casu-
alty & Surety Co. v. Jeppeson & Co., 642 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1981); Saloomey v. Jeppeson &
Co., 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983); Brocklesby v. United States, 753 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1985)).
229. Id at 45.
230. Smith, 563 A.2d at 126.
231. Id.
232. Kercsmar v. Pen Argyl Area Sch. Dist., 1 Pa. D. & C.3d 1 (1976).
233. Id at 2.
234. Smith, 563 A.2d at 127.
235. Id
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rather than support the court's decision. Paraphrased, this argument
claims that a source of information can be held to the standards of strict
product liability because it contains many details and is trusted by a lim-
ited class of people.
The court failed to lobby for protection of a larger group of people,
who relies on general written statements and broad instructions on how
to do something so commonly desired as losing weight. Under a strict
products liability analysis, the tendency is to protect groups with fewer
members. Under a negligence analysis, however, the defendant must not
have actually breached his duty if only a few people are injured.
The contention that a book is a product concededly rests on unsta-
ble pillars of legal support. Nevertheless, there clearly exist some bases
for the argument, rooted in comparisons to similar written documents
that have been found to be products for strict liability purposes. In addi-
tion, the analogy is not as far-fetched as the court implied. The charts
and guides qualified as products because "extremely technical and de-
tailed materials were involved, upon which a limited class of persons im-
posed absolute trust having reason to believe in their unqualified
reliability."" 6 Had the Smith court been confronted with a book with
similar traits, it would not have been able to distinguish the book from
maps and navigational charts. The Smith trial court could have viewed a
book, or only this particular book, as a product, had it wanted to protect
innocent people like Mrs. Smith from the false statements published by
Stuart.
VI. CONCLUSION
In July, 1991, the Ninth Circuit decided Winter v. G.P. Putnam's
Sons2 3 7 ("Winter"). The Winter case was brought by "mushroom enthu-
siasts who became severely ill from picking and eating mushrooms after
relying on information in The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms, a book pub-
lished by the defendant. ' '23 The plaintiffs' suit alleged "liability based
on products liability, breach of warranty, negligence, negligent misrepre-
sentation, and false representations. ' 239 Although the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit was "[g]uided by the First Amendment and the
values embodied therein," 24° its decision contained two basic findings:
236. Id
237. Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
238. Id at 1033.
239. Id at 1034.
240. Id at 1036.
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(1) a book is not a product for the purposes of strict products liability;24
and (2) a publisher has "no duty to investigate the accuracy of the con-
tents of the books it publishes." '242 For the most part, the Ninth Circuit's
decision focused on the required elements of the torts alleged and the
meaning of specific terms as found in those elements. Faced with a sce-
nario almost identical to that in Smith, the Winter court correctly
avoided an unnecessary interpretation of the First Amendment.
The First Amendment protects publishers from liability for harm
caused by books that they publish. State tort and contract laws serve this
same purpose. In order to preserve the force of the First Amendment,
courts should rest their decisions solely on state grounds whenever possi-
ble. This practice would prevent unnecessary and incorrect interpreta-
tions of the First Amendment and serve the legal policy of judicial
economy. Lyle Stuart, Incorporated would have won its motion for sum-
mary judgment under either state or federal law. The next case at issue,
however, may be one where the defendant may be found liable under
state tort or contract law and, at the same time, protected by the First
Amendment. Should this matter arise, the court deciding the case will be
unable to use the reasoning of the Smith decision.
A uniform treatment of book publishers must be established. Cases
relying on only the First Amendment, relevant state laws, and both state
and federal grounds confuse the lower courts following these precedents.
An immediate need exists to decide which laws are appropriate. The
most logical solution is to require the states to apply only state law when-
ever possible. This will ensure uniformity, at least within each state, and
possibly within the federal judicial system as well. The Winter decision
may presage a trend toward treating lawsuits against book publishers
under a tort law analysis. Preservation of the First Amendment depends
on such a trend.
Heather Appleton*
241. Id
242. Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1991).
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